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Abstract
Anthropic reasoning is a critical tool to understand probabilities, especially in a large universe or
multiverse. According to anthropic reasoning, we should consider ourselves typical among members
of a reference class that must include all subjectively indistinguishable observers. We discuss here
whether such a reference class, which we assume must include computer simulations, must also
include computers that replay previous simulations, magnetic tapes that store but do not “run”
the simulation, and even abstract mathematical functions. We do not see any clear criterion for
excluding these anomalous observers, but their presence is deeply troubling to the idea of anthropic
reasoning.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose the universe is large enough that there are instances of multiple intelligent life
forms, or even multiple Earths, spread out at distances too vast to allow any interaction. In
such a universe, different populations will observe different things happening around them.
If the universe is large enough, then any outcome will likely be observed by one of these
populations.
In the face of such a situation, how can we say that one thing is more likely then another?
Anthropic reasoning is a tool used to understand probability in such a universe. Vilenkin’s
[1] Principle of Mediocrity says that we should “think of ourselves as a civilization randomly
picked in the metauniverse.” More specifically, Bostrom’s [2] Self-Sampling Assumption
(SSA) says that “One should reason as if one were a random sample from the set of all
observers in one’s reference class.” By “observer” we mean any conscious agent.1 The
reference class is the class of all observers who are sufficiently alike that we could be, or
could have been, any of them.
If the reference class is well defined, then the anthropic idea of typicality has predictive
value. Consider the following example. Physicists working at CERN find a particle behaving
like the theoretical Higgs Boson with a mass-energy of 125 GeV. They state a confidence of
five sigma, meaning that the chance their observations would have occurred in the absence
of a Higgs is less than one in a million, and thus they can be almost certain that they have
discovered the Higgs. But now suppose the Higgs does not exist, and also suppose that
we are within a multiverse in which there are many millions of copies of these physicists
performing the same experiment looking for the Higgs. For simplicity, assume that the
multiverse is very large but finite. We can expect that one in a million of these physicist-
copies would find the Higgs, even though it is not there. Philosophers here on this Earth
might now say “Perhaps our physicists are those who unluckily have discovered evidence for
the Higgs, even though it does not actually exist. Who knows?”
The anthropic resolution to this concern answers simply that the physicists must consider
their universe to be typical among all the universes in the finite multiverse. Thus, if erroneous
data appears by chance only in one out of a million universes, the chance that it has appeared
here is only one in a million. Therefore, we can be quite confident of having correctly
discovered the Higgs.
The precise definition of the reference class has been a matter of considerable debate.
But, for the example above, it seems sufficient to consider only the class of subjectively
indistinguishable observers. Each observer in that class cannot distinguish himself from
any other observer in the class: they have the same memories and are having the same
experiences and thoughts. Thus it seems that any reference class must be at least as large
as the class of subjectively indistinguishable observers, since by definition one could be any
of those.
Included in this idea is the possibility that two observers can be in two different settings,
but while they are unable to determine which of those settings either one resides, they must
be in the subjectively identical reference class.2
1 The term “observer” for this role may be an odd choice; perhaps “thinker” would be better. Anthropic
ideas were originally discussed for observation of the “constants” of nature, which might vary across the
universe. Since these origins, the use of “observer” has stuck.
2 In its strongest form, anthropic reasoning imagines that we know all information about the universe
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Larger reference classes are often used, but that will not be our concern here. Instead
we will argue that even the class of subjectively indistinguishable observers may be distress-
ingly large, containing exotic observers we would rather have left out. This paper should
be read as a descent into increasing discomfort: we demonstrate first that the somewhat
uncontroversial inclusion of simulations in the reference class (Sec. II) carries with it “slave
computers” (Sec. III), magnetic tapes and similar static data storage devices (Sec. IV), algo-
rithmically compressed data (Sec. V), and eventually even mathematical functions (Sec. VI).
We conclude in Sec. VII by discussing the status of anthropic reasoning in the face of these
anomalous observers.
II. COMPUTER SIMULATIONS
We first consider computer simulations of humans. A sufficiently large computer could
simulate all the atoms in a human body, or it could simulate the operation of the neurons
that make up the brain, or perhaps even simulate human thought directly. Bostrom [4]
argues that we will be able to build computers capable of simulating humans in the not-too-
distant future. We might expect some of the simulations to be intentionally simulated copies
of you or me, and in a sufficiently large universe we should expect some of the simulations
coincidentally to be copies of you or me. We assume here that human consciousness arises
from the operation of the biochemical constituents of the human body and brain, and there-
fore that, at a minimum, faithful simulation of these constituents would lead to a faithful
simulation of human consciousness.
Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the states of the simulated brain and
the states of a real brain, the observer in such a case cannot distinguish which of the two
she is. Thus, it follows simply that simulations should be included in the reference class of
subjectively identical observers.
A computer simulation is somewhat analogous to the “brain in a vat” that has occasioned
much discussion. Advocates of Putnam’s response to brain-in-a-vat skepticism may try to
argue a similar case to dismiss simulations from the reference class. The argument would
go as follows. Suppose in fact I am a computer simulation, and suppose I say “I am a
computer simulation”. When I say “computer simulation”, these words refer not to the type
of thing I actually am, but to another type of thing that might be performed on a “simulated
computer” in my simulated world. Therefore, whether or not I am in a simulation, the
statement “I am a computer simulation” is false when I say it. By this, the argument goes,
I cannot be a computer simulation.
We will give two responses to this claim. For a moment, let us accept the externalist
viewpoint. Thus, we will concede that when the human wonders whether she is a computer
simulation, she is wondering about something different than what the simulation wonders in
its equivalent processes. If these entities could distinguish between the two possibilities they
could wonder about, then they would not be subjectively identical. But it is only the external
differences that lead to the difference in the content of their thoughts; these differences are
(including the number of duplicate observers), except where we are located within that universe. This
premise is familiar from the literature on self-locating beliefs. Bostrom [3] distinguishes anthropics from
philosophy of self-locating beliefs: anthropics is a method to account for selection effects in the face of
self-locating doubt.
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not accessible to them. Thus even though their thoughts are, on the externalist reading,
different, they do not have access to the externals that distinguish these thoughts, and so
are still subjectively indistinguishable.
Our second response to Putnam’s sort of reasoning is that “computer simulation” is a
generic term analogous to “envatted” [5] rather than a natural kind term like “brain”. In
particular, even if “sims” have access only to sim computers, the idea of a computer and
its use is universal (the same for sims and for organic humans), because it is essentially
a mathematical concept, as formalized by Turing [6]. By this analysis, sims and organic
humans mean the same thing when they utter “I am a computer simulation”, and Putnam’s
argument does not apply. We can also imagine an organic mind whose brain state will be
copied into a computer simulation. Presumably, at least at first, the simulation’s thoughts
and utterances have the same referents that they had when the thoughts lived in the original
organic mind (see [7, p. 81] and the “recent matrix hypothesis” of [5]). These are by no
means exhaustive accounts of the philosophical foundations for simulations, but we feel that
they are sufficient to preserve the feasibility of simulations in the anthropic reference class
of subjective indistinguishability.
To understand how simulations could arise in anthropic questions, suppose that when
you go to sleep tonight, the state of your brain is copied into a computer simulation, and
that you know that this is going to happen. If this simulation is part of the reference class,
when you awake tomorrow, you should think the odds are 1:1 that you are now the computer
simulation. If there are 100 computer simulations, you should think that the odds are 100:1.
In the latter case, we have assumed that duplicate computer simulations count as separate
observers in the reference class. We will now explore whether this is a safe assumption to
make. One issue arises because of the use of redundancy in computer design. Consider a
computer that, for the sake of reliability, completes every process and computation twice.3
If we want to count all duplicate simulation programs as separate, it appears we must
consider such a system as two observers. But why should it matter to the philosopher how
the computer engineer did her job?4 Anthropic reasoning has given us a window, which
probably should not exist, into the precise design of the computer running a simulation.
So what of the alternative: identical simulation programs count collectively as one ob-
server? Again consider 100 identical computer simulations. They all count as one observer.
But now imagine several of the computers malfunction and the programs deviate [8]. Do
these deviating simulations suddenly count as multiple observers in the reference class? It is
easy to imagine multiple observers if the deviations are significant, but consider 100 simula-
tions at the atomic level: do we count multiple observers if the deviations are as insignificant
as a single atom? This is a weak reason for the spontaneous creation of a new observer:
the change is indistinguishable. There does not seem to be any non-arbitrary cutoff that
justifies a new observer.
Another problem is that just by changing a tiny detail of the simulation that does not
enter into the simulated observer’s consciousness, we can split or combine observers. Suppose
there are 10 groups of 100 simulations each. The simulations in each group are identical,
but the groups are different from each other because they have decided on different bets
3 Such computers have in fact been built, for example, by Tandem Computers, Inc.
4 For that matter, consider the low-level design of the computer. Every operation in an electronic computer
is represented by the movement of a large number of electrons. So, in a certain sense, all computers have
a high degree of redundancy.
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in a 10-horse race. Now suppose that after the race is run, the simulation program makes
a tiny change to each of the 100 simulations that bet on the winning horse. Those 100
simulations thus become different observers, and there are 109 observers: 100 winners and
9 losers. Thus, before the race is run, each observer thinks her chance to win is 1/10, but
afterwards (perhaps even before the result is posted), she thinks the chance that she has
won is 100/109, quite an anomalous result.
We might avoid this type of problem by saying that all deviating observers count as
separate observers in the reference class at any point in time, even before the observers
deviate. But this is even worse, because it allows communication backward in time. If we
apply this analysis to the above example, we find that the 109 different observers exist even
before the race is run. Thus immediately upon placing her bet, every observer should believe
with confidence 100/109 that she will be a winner.
The above reasons lead us to reject the proposal that only deviating observers count
separately, and we return to the assumption that duplicate observers count separately in
the reference class in all circumstances.5
III. SLAVE COMPUTERS
So far, we have not said anything about the operation of a computer simulation. We will
use the following simple model. The computer has a large memory which stores a representa-
tion of the current state of the brain being simulated. Data structures in the memory could
represent thoughts, neurons, or atoms, depending on the level of the simulation. There
is then a program that advances the simulation to the next state, based on the previous
state and inputs representing the sensory information going into the brain. This program
runs over and over again, advancing through a sequence of states representing the states
of a thinking brain. The interval of simulated time between one state and the next should
be small compared to any timescale of the process being simulated (e.g., the timescale of
chemical reactions in atomic-level simulation). This allows a discrete-time simulation to ac-
curately model a continuous physical process. Simulation techniques such as this are widely
used in science.
Suppose there is such a computer simulation running, and now consider a second com-
puter that works in a different way. It has the same type of memory and processor as the
first computer, but rather than deriving each state from the next, this second computer
merely copies each state that the first computer generates. This “slave computer” thus goes
through exactly the same states as the principal computer whose memory it is copying.
Does such a slave computer count as a separate member of the reference class? Suppose,
for example, you know that you exist as a computer simulation that is being run on 2
principal computers A and B. Suppose right now the simulations are identical, but soon
simulations A and B will have different experiences, FA and FB. Then, your credence that
5 An organic brain is even more redundant than an electronic computer, and one might ask whether we
should now count one human as a large number of duplicate observers in the reference class. This seems
quite an unattractive idea, but it might have the interesting effect of providing a solution to the “doomsday
argument” [9, 10]. Perhaps today’s highly redundant biological observers will be succeeded by many more
observers running on very efficient computers, but because each of us biological humans appears many
times in the reference class, we might still be typical among all observers to ever exist.
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you will soon experience FA should be 50%. But now suppose A has 99 slaves while B has
none. Should you now consider the odds to be 100:1 that you will experience FA rather than
FB?
We might try to exclude slave computers from the reference class by an appeal to causal
relationships. The successive states of the slave computer are not causally related to each
other, but rather each is passively copied from the principal computer. Perhaps this does
not constitute “thinking”, and it would not be possible for one to be such a slave computer.
Unfortunately, there is a problematic feature in this appeal to causality. Suppose the
second computer at each step first copies the state from the principal computer, but then
computes this same state by operation of the regular program (on a saved copy of the
previous state). Does this second step make the computer not a slave, because the “direct
cause” of the state is computation rather than copying? The second step consists of storing
some data into memory, when that exact same data was in that memory already, so it seems
rather vacuous. Suppose the second computer does the computation, but then discards
the result, which is hardly different from storing it in the locations that contain it already.
Would it now be excluded from the reference class?
If copy followed by computation admits the second computer to the reference class, then
what about the reverse case, where the state is first computed and then overwritten with an
identical state produced by copying? In this case, the “direct cause” is the copying of the
data (into locations that already contain it). In this case, is the second computer now to be
excluded from the reference class?
These considerations appear to weaken the intuition that there exists a distinction based
on causality, and so we must be open to the idea of including slave computers in the reference
class.
IV. MAGNETIC TAPES
Now consider a slightly different situation. The principal computer runs the simulation,
computes the successive brain states, and writes them onto magnetic tape. At a later time,
the slave computer copies the states one by one from the tape into its working memory. On
the grounds that the details by which the data travel from one computer to another should
not matter, it seems that this slave computer also should belong in the reference class.
But what is the importance of actually reading the tape? Suppose that the memory of
the slave computer is broken, so that it cannot be read. This should not make a difference,
because this computer never reads its memory. Now suppose instead that the memory is
broken so that the data written to it is never actually stored. Does this exclude the computer
from the reference class? Why should it matter whether the data was successfully stored in
the memory when it cannot be read? Functionally, there is no difference between unreadable
and unwritable memory, so why should it matter here?
In a real computer, it is possible to page through a file by keeping the entire file in
physical memory and merely adjusting pointers so that successive parts of the file appear in
the same location in the virtual memory of a computer program. This operation is equivalent
to reading successive sections of the file into memory. Does the program that does nothing
but manipulate pointers count as a member of the reference class?
Perhaps the reading of the tape does not matter, and the tape itself is a member of the
reference class. But this seems quite counterintuitive; should I really be concerned that I
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am just some static data sitting somewhere on a tape?6 If the tape is duplicated, does the
existence of the second tape constitute a second observer? Each bit on a magnetic tape
is stored in the spins of many electrons in a region of the magnetic material. Does this
redundancy mean that each tape itself constitutes many observers?
V. COMPRESSED DATA
Presumably, the precise way in which the successive brain states are written on the
magnetic tape does not determine whether the tape belongs in the reference class. A tape
drive today might well have a data compression algorithm, so that what appears on the
tape is not the actual data, but a compressed version of it that in common cases will use
less space on the tape. The existence of such a system should be of no consequence for
membership in the reference class.
But note that the program which produces each brain state from its predecessor is just
evaluating some mathematical function, so, say, xn = f(xn−1) where xn is the current state
and xn−1 is its predecessor. Thus xn can be found by applying f successively n times to some
initial state f0. This fact permits an extremely efficient compression procedure, in which
rather than writing xn on the tape, we just write n, and the reading program understands
this to mean xn. But then, if the tape containing the normally compressed brain states is to
be considered an observer, what about the tape which just contains successive integers that
constitute super-compressed versions of the brain states? To take this absurd conclusion
even further, given any set of data there is some decompression algorithm that turns it
into any other set of data. Does this mean that any set of data constitutes an observer
subjectively indistinguishable from me?
VI. PURE MATHEMATICS
The successive states of the computer simulation, xn are just large collections of bits,
which could equally well be interpreted as integers. But integers, or a sequences of integers,
exist as purely mathematical objects whether or not some actual computer happens to
be computing those numbers. So, should we think that the observer represented by the
sequence {xn} or, alternatively, by the number x0 and the function f , exists as an object in
the abstract world of mathematics? That is to say, could we be confused as to whether we
are mathematical abstractions [11]?
If our lives up to the present are represented by a finite sequence of integers, and different
future possibilities are represented by different continuations of this sequence, what does it
mean for one future to be more likely to another? It doesn’t make sense to say that a given
sequence can exist more than once as an abstract mathematical entity, but if all sequences
exist just once it seems that that all possible futures are equally likely, which would make
nonsense of our normal ideas of probability.
6 The magnetic tape can be considered a realization of the eternalist idea that separation in time is analogous
to separation in space. The different moments in the observer’s consciousness are physically positioned
in different places along the tape. If one considers eternalism as viable, then magnetic tape observers are
not as far-fetched as they may at first seem.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In a large universe, there might be many people identical to us. They may have the
same history that we have, but their futures may be different. Since we don’t know which
of these people we are, we make predictions by considering ourselves as randomly chosen
members of some reference class. It seems that this reference class must contain all observers
subjectively identical to us, because any such observer cannot distinguish herself from any
other such observer.7
Unfortunately, it appears that even the class of subjectively indistinguishable observers
is much larger than one would want. Computer simulations of human beings should be
included, but then it becomes hard to draw a line between such simulations and other cases
that are quite anomalous. We have argued that once computer simulations are included,
one should also include computers that do nothing but copy “brain states” from one place
to another, or even that the list of brain states without any action should be considered
an observer. If that is true, maybe the list of numbers representing states, viewed as a
mathematical abstraction, should also be included.
Including such anomalous members of the reference class seems ridiculous, so perhaps
anthropic reasoning should be abandoned. But then it is hard to make sense of everyday
ideas about the likelihood of future events. How can I give a probability distribution to
what may happen to me tomorrow, if some copy of me will experience every possible future?
The basic idea of anthropic reasoning seems necessary, and it adequately solves the simplest
case of a large, finite universe with a finite number of duplicate observers, so we would be
reluctant to give it up.
The underlying problem here seems to be that the results of anthropic reasoning may de-
pend on the answers to deep questions in the philosophy of mind and identity theory. While
we would like to know the answers to such questions as “Which entities are possibly us?”
and “When are two copies the same person and when are they two people?”, these answers
traditionally have no practical effect. Somehow, anthropic reasoning seems to privilege these
philosophical queries by granting them influence on our reasoning about which theories of
physics and cosmology are correct.
We feel this poses a serious puzzle. In the absence of any alternative theory to make
sense of probabilities, there should be a way to utilize anthropic ideas without including
anomalous copies of ourselves. Unfortunately at present we are not able to find any solution
that we feel is adequate.
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